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Abstract 
The WTO agricultural negotiations of the Doha round are a key issue in the public debate. This 
paper analyses the effects of different options to improve market-access on the basis of a GTAP 
model, comparing the impact of the Harbinson proposal and the Swiss formula on trade 
balances. An extended version of the GTAP model is used to first project a base run that 
includes factors arising from Agenda 2000, EU enlargement, the EBA agreement and the EU’s 
mid-term review. The policy simulation run additionally includes the WTO negotiations. Here, 
the model is differentiated between three experiments. While the first experiment simply 
implements the Harbinson proposal, the second one additionally takes into account an adoption 
of the EBA agreement by all industrialised countries. In the third experiment, the tariff cuts are 
based on the Swiss formula using a coefficient of 33 instead of the tiered approach of the 
Harbinson proposal.  
After comparing the results of the three experiments, the paper concludes that the results from 
the different options for improving market access show parallel developments, with more- or 
less-pronounced increases or decreases in trade balances. Implementation of the Harbinson 
approach results in negative changes in the EU’s trade balances for most agricultural products, 
except for the sugar, milk and other animal products sectors. The application of the Swiss 
formula to cut tariffs predictably results in severe losses to highly protected sectors worldwide 
in comparison to the Harbinson approach. In the EU, the highly protected sectors of beef and 
other processed food products would be particularly affected. 
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ENARPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 12/FEBRUARY 2005 
MARTINA BROCKMEIER, MARIANNE KURZWEIL, JANINE PELIKAN 
AND PETRA SALAMON 
1. Introduction 
A great deal of attention is currently being paid to the discussion of the reform of global 
agricultural trade. In 2000, the WTO initiated a new round of trade negotiations on agriculture 
and services. According to the Doha mandate adopted on 14 November 2001, the WTO 
members committed themselves to substantially improve market access, to reduce (with a view 
to phasing out) all forms of export subsidies and to substantially reduce trade-distorting 
domestic support (WTO, 2001). Furthermore, it was also agreed that non-trade concerns and 
special and differential treatment for developing countries should become an integral feature 
throughout the negotiations.  
In February 2003 a first attempt to agree on modalities, the so-called Harbinson paper, was 
presented to the WTO members (WTO, 2003a) and revised after intensive discussion. Based on 
the resulting Harbinson 1½  paper
1 (WTO, 2003b), the Doha Ministerial Declaration requested 
WTO members to agree upon formulas and other modalities by 31 March 2003 at the latest. But 
negotiators missed this deadline. While the US and the Cairns Group considered the tariff 
reductions of the Harbinson 1½ paper as too low and preferred the Swiss formula, the EU 
considered the liberalisation proposals as too far reaching. Together with 75 other WTO 
members (friends of the Uruguay formula) the EU pleaded for a repetition of the Uruguay round 
of agriculture and especially for the implementation of the Uruguay formula for tariff reduction 
(Brockmeier & Salamon, 2004).  
After 31 March 2003, negotiators selected a number of controversial issues and aimed at 
achieving a framework agreement at the ministerial conference taking place in Cancún on 11-14 
September 2003. The EU and the US were the first to come forward with a draft (WTO, 2003c). 
The joint US-EU text suggested a blended formula under which the tariffs were subdivided into 
three groups. The tariffs of the first group were categorised as duty free, while the tariffs of the 
second group were to be reduced by an average with a minimum reduction per product (the 
Uruguay round formula). The third group of tariffs were supposed to be reduced by the Swiss 
formula (WTO, 2004a, p. 12). 
Subsequently, six alternative drafts resembling the US-EU structure followed, which were 
developed by the G-20, four Central American countries, Japan, Norway, Kenya and a 
European-East Asian grouping including Switzerland and the Republic of Korea. Comments on 
all these drafts led to an annex in the draft ministerial declaration submitted to the Cancún 
conference by General Council Chairperson Péres del Castillo (WTO, 2003d). The Castillo text 
                                                  
1 The ‘Harbinson 1½ proposal’ is the revised form of the Harbinson proposal, which is often called 
‘Harbinson 2’. Because the revised draft is only partially revised from the first version, the term 
Harbinson 1½ proposal is used in the following text (see also Josling, 2003, p. 12).  2 | BROCKMEIER, KURZWEIL, PELIKAN & SALAMON 
 
was revised on 13 September 2003 by the Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez 
(WTO, 2003e). Yet because of the deadlock on the four Singapore issues,
2 the Derbez text was 
never negotiated in detail at the 5th ministerial conference in Cancún. 
After the failure of Cancún a new negotiation process started at the beginning of 2004. On 16 
July 2004, the chairman of the agricultural committee, Tim Grosser, presented a new proposal 
on modalities for negotiations on agricultural trade (WTO, 2004b). An amended version of the 
Grosser text was then presented (WTO, 2004c) and adopted in a revised form by the WTO 
General Council on 31 July 2004 as part of the Doha Work Programme or Oshima-text (WTO, 
2004d).  
Although it seemed as if the disputing parties had reached an agreement, the outcome of the 
negotiations is still highly uncertain. In contrast to the former papers, the content of this recently 
adopted proposal is very vague. It contains (almost exclusively) qualitative information about 
tariff cuts, the abolition of export subsidies, etc., but does not make any concrete statement 
regarding the time horizon or magnitude of the protection cuts. Nor does the more or less 
nebulous consistency of the Doha Work Programme July package help to resolve the most 
important issue of market access: What kind of tiered formula will be used to cut down the 
import tariffs? What effect does a tiered formula, such as the Harbinson formula, have in 
contrast to a more flexible one, such as the Swiss formula? How will the preferential treatment 
of the developing countries be achieved? 
Against this background this paper analyses different options currently discussed for market 
access focusing on variations of the Harbinson 1½ proposal and the Swiss formula. Simulating 
several modified approaches sheds light on the impacts resulting from certain policy 
interventions. In order to provide a brief overview about the contents of the previous proposals, 
section 2 illuminates the Harbinson 1½ paper, the Swiss formula and the Doha Work 
Programme in greater detail. In section 3 the methodological instrument – the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) –is introduced together with the theoretical extensions it uses for the 
calculations. Thereafter, model design and experiments are introduced in section 4, while results 
and conclusions are presented in sections 5 and 6. 
2. Overview  of  proposals, formulas and compromises 
2.1  Harbinson 1½ approach 
The Harbinson paper shows that the classic negotiation topics are still at the centre of the Doha 
round. For domestic support, the overall reduction of the aggregated measurement of support 
(AMS) is proposed to be 60% for developed countries and 40% for developing countries. At the 
same time, the product-specific AMS is not allowed to exceed the average level of the years 
1999-2001. The direct payments of the blue box could either be limited to the specified level, 
and then be reduced by 50% for developed and 33% for developing countries, or they could be 
integrated into the AMS presently specified in the GATT and then be reduced by 60%. The 
payments should be reduced in equal annual instalments over a period of five years for 
developed countries and ten years for developing countries. The green box measures will be 
maintained. Furthermore, a reduction of the de minimis level of 5% annually by 0.5% over a 
period of five years for developed countries is proposed. For developing countries, the de 
minimis level of 10% should be maintained.  
With respect to export competition, the Harbinson 1½ proposal calls for a 100% elimination of 
export subsidies within two staggered categories (five and nine years). For developing 
                                                  
2 The Singapore issues include the following four topics of the Singapore ministerial conference (1996): 
investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation. WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS | 3 
 
countries, special and differential treatment is proposed with reduction categories of 10 and 12 
years. Export credits, export credit guarantees and insurance programmes as well as 
international food aid and state-trading export enterprises shall be subject to disciplines. 
To improve market access, three ranges of reduction commitments are defined for developed 
countries and four are defined for developing countries according to their specified GATT 
commitments. These ranges are summarised in Table 1. 
It is proposed that the tariff reductions should be implemented in equal annual instalments over 
a period of five years. Moreover, the tariff rate quotas (TRQs) of developed (developing) 
countries that are smaller than 10% (6.6%) of domestic consumption shall be extended to that 
level. Alternatively, developed (developing) countries could extend the TRQs to 8% (5%) of 
their domestic consumption for some products, providing that the volume of a corresponding 
number of TRQs is expanded to 12% (8%). The implementation period is also favoured to be 
five years. Tariff rates within the TRQs are not subject to any change provided the fill rate of 
the TRQ exceeds 65%. For tropical products, the in-quota tariff should be zero.  
Table 1. Tariff reduction formulas of the Harbinson 1½ proposal (%) 
 Initial  tariff  rate 
(ad valorem) 
Average 
reduction rate 
Minimum cut 
> 90  60  45 
≤ 90 and > 15  50 35  Developed countries 
≤ 15  40  25 
> 120  40  30 
≤ 120 and > 60  35  25 
≤60 and >20  30 20 
Developing countries 
≤ 20  25  15 
Source: WTO (2003b). 
In addition to the special and differential treatment for developing countries, the Harbinson 
1½ paper accords special treatment for less developed countries laces. They should be exempt 
from any reduction commitments and developed countries should provide duty and quota-free 
market access for all imports from developing countries. 
2.2 Swiss  formula 
In the course of the negotiations held in the Uruguay round, the Swiss formula was an approach 
proposed by Switzerland concerning tariff cuts in the field of industrial commodities. According 
to this formula the new tariff rate is determined by the base rate (T0) and a coefficient (a): T1 = 
(T0 * a) / (T0 + a). In the current agricultural negotiations of the Doha round, the US proposed 
applying a coefficient value of 25 to this formula. Under these conditions, all tariff rates on 
agricultural products will be harmonised at a level below 25% within a five-year period through 
a non-linear reduction process. Since tariff cuts based on the Swiss formula are dependent on 
the level of the base rate, it brings about larger reductions in the highest tariff rates. 
2.3  Doha Work Programme 
The Doha Work Programme comprises an overall cut of all trade-distorting domestic support 
according to a tired formula. Under this formula, higher levels of trade-distorting domestic 
support will be subject to deeper cuts to achieve a harmonised result. For all developed 
countries a down payment of 20% during the first year of the implementation period will be 
made. The cut will be based on binding rates.  4 | BROCKMEIER, KURZWEIL, PELIKAN & SALAMON 
 
Furthermore, a reduction of the de minimis loophole will be negotiated and the criteria for the 
green box will be reviewed. The blue box support should not exceed 5% of the average total 
value of agricultural production during a historical reference period that has not yet been 
specified. This stands in contrast to the Derbez text, which suggests dates for the reference 
period (2000-02) and linear reductions for an (x) number of years (ICTSD, 2004). 
On export competition, the Doha Work Programme ensures the elimination of all forms of 
export subsidies. Moreover, all export measures with effects equivalent to export subsidies will 
be eliminated, such as export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes with 
repayment periods beyond 180 days. Export credits of less than 180 days and trade distorting 
practices of state trading enterprises (STES) will be subject to strict disciplines. Moreover, 
concrete disciplines will be imposed on food aid that is used for commercial displacement. 
A substantial reduction in market access barriers will be achieved through a tiered approach 
with deeper cuts in higher tariffs. The reduction commitments will be made from binding tariff 
rates applicable to all members other than the least developed countries (LDCs). Countries can 
self-select sensitive products that will be treated in a more flexible way. As compensation, the 
TRQs of sensitive products have to be expanded. 
For developing countries, special and differential treatment is provided. They will be 
accorded longer implementation periods, lower tariff and subsidy cuts and special concessions 
for their market access. Furthermore, trade with tropical products will be fully liberalised and 
the erosion of trade preferences will be addressed. LDCs do not have to lower their tariffs or 
their domestic farm support. Developed countries and capable developing countries should 
provide duty- and quota-free market access for LDC products (European Commission, 2004, p. 
1).  
In sum, if the Grosser text is compared with the Harbinson 1½ paper, it is obvious that there is 
less detail in the decision adopted in July 2004. A detailed comparison of the Harbinson 1½ 
paper with the July 2004 General Council Decision is given in Table A1 of the appendix. 
3. GTAP  framework 
3.1  Standard GTAP model 
The analyses in this paper are based on the GTAP model (a comparative-static, standard multi-
regional general equilibrium model). It provides an elaborate representation of the economy 
including the linkages between the farming, agribusiness, industrial and service sectors of the 
economy. The use of the non-homothetic constant difference of elasticity (CDE) functional 
form to handle private household preferences, the explicit treatment of international trade and 
transport margins and a global banking sector that links global savings and consumption are 
innovative in the GTAP. Trade is represented by bilateral trade matrices based on the 
Armington assumption. Further features of the standard model are perfect competition in all 
markets as well as a profit- and utility-maximising behaviour of producers and consumers. All 
policy interventions are represented by price wedges.
3  
                                                  
3 The framework of the standard GTAP model is well documented in the GTAP book (Hertel, 1997) and 
available on the Internet (retrieved from http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/). The GTAP model is 
solved using the GEMPACK (General Equilibrium Modeling Package) software, version 8.0 and 
RunGTAP, version 3.23 (Harrison & Pearson, 1996). WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS | 5 
 
3.2  Extensions of the standard GTAP model 
3.2.1  Policy instruments of the CAP 
Agricultural policy instruments are represented through price wedges in the standard GTAP 
model. Therefore, the standard GTAP model is complemented with an explicit modelling of the 
most important policy instruments of the common agricultural policy (CAP). 
As a result of implementing the outcome of WTO negotiations, the EU trade regime and 
consequently prices on the internal market will be changed. How does this affect the raw milk 
and sugar markets, which are both regulated through quantitative restrictions? Whether an 
implemented quota restricts production depends on the actual price reduction caused by the 
changing trade regime. If market prices exceed production costs, a quota rent exists and the 
quota is binding. When the relevant price drops below production costs the quota rent 
disappears and the quota might become non-binding. Thus, a quota module that allows for a 
binding and a non-binding quota system depending on the economic environment would be 
favourable. Such a formulation can be integrated into the GTAP model in the form of a 
complementary approach (Bach & Pearson, 1996; Van Tongeren, 2002). This approach enables 
the model to endogenously switch between binding and non-binding states. Additionally, the 
quota rent is determined endogenously as well.  
Another important modelling issue is related to the EU’s mid-term review (MTR. Following the 
approach of Frandsen et al. (2002), we introduce an additional land subsidy rate into the model 
that is equalised across all sectors entitled to direct payments.
4 With the implementation of the 
MTR, the existing domestic support measures are converted into a region-specific, fully 
decoupled land-area payment, while budgetary outlays for total domestic support are held 
constant. 
3.2.2  EU budget 
The EU budget is introduced in the GTAP model using an innovative Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM). This SAM not only covers the expenditures and revenues of already existing agents 
(e.g. producers, government and private households), but also the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). This EU budget receives 75% of the import duties for 
agricultural and non-agricultural products from producers, private households, government and 
capital accounts. Additional revenues result from an endogenously calculated GDP-related tax, 
which flows from regional households to the EU budget. Here, all EU member countries face an 
equal GDP tax rate. Revenues of the EU budget are used to cover agricultural output and export 
subsidies as well as direct payments. In contrast to these product-specific instruments, 
expenditures for structural policies are not covered within the EU budget module. Owing to 
their characteristics and specific aims, structural funds cannot be allocated to certain 
commodities. This strongly hampers their incorporation in a product-specific model such as the 
GTAP. 
Obviously, revenues of the EU budget from one member country are not identical with the 
expenditures of the EU budget on the same member country. A comparison of revenues and 
expenditures of each member state therefore shows the net transfer that takes place within the 
EU financial system. Analogous to capital transfer, the net transfer within the EU is part of the 
current account balance, which makes up the difference between exports and imports of goods 
and services. Nevertheless, the sum of net transfers of all member countries equals zero, since 
the EU budget is balanced through the endogenous GDP tax rate.  
                                                  
4 We are grateful to Hans Jensen for his support with regard to implementing the decoupling. 6 | BROCKMEIER, KURZWEIL, PELIKAN & SALAMON 
 
In the standard GTAP model, EAGGF revenues and expenditures are organised through 
regional households. All components of the EU budget are therefore introduced with the help of 
dummy variables allowing an easy shift from regional households to the EU budget and vice 
versa. Consequently, a preliminary simulation is employed to move the GTAP database from 
the initial situation without the EU budget to a new equilibrium where the EU budget is in 
charge of the EAGGF (Brockmeier, 2003, pp. 100-12). 
3.2.3  Projection module 
Along with changes in the political environment of an economy, macroeconomic developments 
such as technical progress are of great importance for the economic growth of an economy. In 
order to take these changes into account, corresponding trends are incorporated in the analysis at 
hand. For this purpose an approach by Walmsley et al. (2000) is used, which allows the 
inclusion of exogenous projections of the global and regional GDP and factor endowment in the 
extended GTAP model. In the simulations, technical progress is generated endogenously by the 
model, enabling the projected growth pattern. 
4. Simulations 
4.1 Database  and  aggregation 
The simulations are based on the GTAP database version 5 with 1997 as the base year. The 
database consists of bilateral trade, transport and protection matrices that link 57 sectors in 76 
countries or regions. In order to keep the calculation effort within a reasonable scope, the 
database is aggregated into 23 regions and 19 sectors (see Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix). 
The regional sets are put together with regard to geographical nearness, developmental status or 
membership in certain regional agreements. With regard to the sectoral aggregation, it was 
important to distinguish between primary and processed agricultural production sectors as well 
as between production commodities regulated through a quota and sensitive products. 
4.2 Experiments 
Before the actual simulations are carried out, it is necessary to conduct some pre-simulations to 
implement the extended model structure and to update the protection rates (see Figure 1 and 
Table A4). This includes CAP instruments and the EU’s common budget. 
Figure 1. Base run and simulations 
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Based on the results of the pre-simulation, a base run is conducted, which represents a 
projection of the exogenous variables of population, GDP and factor endowment up to the year 
2014. Additionally, Agenda 2000 (2005), EU enlargement and the EBA agreement (2007), as 
well as the MTR are implemented (for details see Table A4). The base run only considers 
political intervention in the EU-15 and in the candidate countries. Developments in other 
regions, such as those specified in the US Farm Bill, are not taken into account. 
Parallel to the base run, a scenario is implemented as well. It takes account of the same 
projections and policy shocks (Agenda 2000, EU enlargement, the EBA agreement and the 
MTR), but in the time period from 2007 to 2014; additionally, it includes simulations related to 
the WTO round. The July package leaves a lot of room for speculation on how market access 
will be enabled through agricultural trade negotiations. Thus, in the following experiments 
various options for market access as implemented in the Doha round are played through. A total 
of three simulations are carried out. The first two simulations capture the Harbinson 1½ 
proposal and a possible modification.  
In Experiment 1 all countries implement a cut on the import tariffs according to the Harbinson 
1½ proposal (as discussed in section 2.1), while export subsidies are completely abolished. 
Experiment 2 is identical to Experiment 1, but all other developed countries implement the EU's 
EBA initiative by granting preferential market access to LDCs. Experiment 3 also resembles 
Experiment 1, but countries are obliged to reduce their import tariffs according to the Swiss 
formula using a coefficient of 33. The effects of the WTO round are obtained by comparing the 
results of the base run and the scenario in 2014. Table 2 summarises the simulations. 
Table 2. WTO simulations 
  Import tariff cut  EBA adopted in 
Experiment  Harbinson 1½  Swiss formula  developed countries 
1  x  –  – 
2  x  –  x 
3  –  x  – 
 
5. Results 
This section discusses the results of six experiments analysing the implementation of the WTO 
negotiations under different options for market access. The results are presented in $US millions 
for the 1997 GTAP database. We mainly focus on the trade balance. The appendix provides 
detailed results for the output of production (Tables A5 to A7) on a disaggregated country level. 
Changes in the output of production are mainly induced by the changes in the trade regime. The 
output results show a pattern that is similar to the changes in the trade balance and is only being 
discussed rudimentarily. 
Tables 3 and 4 report the changes in the regional trade balance by commodity for Experiments 1 
and 2 respectively. The change in trade balance represents the change in the value of fob exports 
minus the value of cif imports.  
Examination of the entries in Table 3 shows that the biggest changes in the EU-27 occur in the 
highly protected beef and other food product sectors. Other sectors, such as wheat, other crops, 
fruit and vegetables also experience a decrease in export values relative to imports, although 
these sectors are only moderately protected. Conversely, the dairy products and sugar sectors 
show a positive development in the trade balance.  8 | BROCKMEIER, KURZWEIL, PELIKAN & SALAMON 
 
It is not surprising that the trade balances of sensitive sectors such as beef will deteriorate in the 
EU-27. But where does the positive development in the trade balances of sugar and milk 
products come from? Milk products are one of the most protected products worldwide. 
Apparently, the loss in the EU trade balance for dairy products owing to EU import tariff cuts is 
overcompensated by the gain resulting from an increase of EU dairy product exports following 
the decrease of third countries’ import tariffs. Accordingly, this development is mirrored in the 
negative trade balances of the US, Canada, Japan, other European countries (SONEU) and 
Mediterranean and North African countries (MEDNO). The biggest gain, however, accrues for 
Australia and New Zealand (Oceania) where the trade balance shows an impressive increase of 
over $1.6 billion.  
Table 3 also reveals an extremely negative impact of the implementation of the Harbinson 1½ 
proposal on the trade balance for sugar in the EBA region, which is accompanied by a moderate 
deterioration of the sugar trade balance in the US. Given the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
agreement already in place, the LDCs have to face an erosion of their preferences in the WTO 
negotiations. Nevertheless, the loss is not solely attributable to the reduction of import tariffs by 
developed countries and the EU. Rather, the abolition of the EU’s sugar export subsidy also 
strongly effects this development. Brazil and the other African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries (AAKP) can take advantage of this development and show an anticipated increase of 
exports relative to imports. 
Significant negative changes after the implementation of the Harbinson 1½ package are also 
shown in the sector comprising a variety of processed food products. Here, Table 3 reveals 
that the EU-27 and Japan account for the highest loss while all other industrialised regions show 
positive changes in their trade balance. A decomposition of the results for the EU-27 is 
presented in Figure 2.
5 It indicates a particularly negative development of the EU’s trade 
balance as a result of the reduction of the EU’s import tariffs applied to imports coming from 
developing countries and other industrial countries. In contrast, the abolition of export subsidies 
has a surprisingly minor negative impact. The trade-related changes are passed on to the EU’s 
production of processed food, which shrinks by 2.7% (see Table A5).  
Figure 2. Decomposition of the changes in the EU-27’s trade balance of processed food 
products (Experiment 1, Harbinson 1½ proposal) ($US millions) 
-6000 -5000 -4000 -3000 -2000 -1000 0 1000
total
export sub (industrial countries, developing countries)
import tariff (developing countries, industrial countries)
import tariff (industrial countries, developing countries)
import tariff (industrial countries, industrial countries)
rest
-6000 -5000 -4000 -3000 -2000 -1000 0 1000
total
export sub (industrial countries, developing countries)
import tariff (developing countries, industrial countries)
import tariff (industrial countries, developing countries)
import tariff (industrial countries, industrial countries)
rest
total
export sub (industrial countries, developing countries)
import tariff (developing countries, industrial countries)
import tariff (industrial countries, developing countries)
import tariff (industrial countries, industrial countries)
rest
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
                                                  
5 The results (total changes) are decomposed into parts (so-called ‘subtotals’) attributable to changes in 
individual exogenous variables (e.g. policy instruments). The decomposition of the total effect into 
subtotals thereby allows the identification of changes that govern the results. Here, the decomposition is 
based on the changes of policy instruments (import tax and export subsidies) that are applied on bilateral 
trade flows. Thus, the policy instrument as well as the source (first expression in brackets) and destination 
(second expression in brackets) of the trade flow subject to the policy instrument can be identified. WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS | 9 
 
Table 3. Changes in the trade balance in Experiment 1 (Harbinson 1½ proposal) ($US millions) 
EU-27 USA CAN OZE INDO MAL
Wheat -61 533 853 52 -37 -13
Other Crops -592 639 179 168 -11 -19
Oil Seeds 188 584 99 10 -16 -31
Rice -124 129 -1 36 -1 1
Vegetables, Fruits -92 -402 -25 -91 99 -156
Cattle 201 178 -8 -33 -6 -1
Other Animal Products 566 -165 -81 -150 -13 -2
Beef -2606 1055 74 1369 -2 -4
Other Meat Products -253 1036 -94 35 -7 -20
Vegetable Oils and Fats -284 -30 -30 -22 10 210
Dairy Products 205 -140 -79 1631 -15 21
Sugar 768 -393 58 86 2 -10
Other Food Products -5300 1602 365 300 266 -45
Beverages and Tobacco 318 -379 -31 -110 -3 -1
Primary Products 125 -69 -3 -199 13 -98
Manufactures 4261 -3212 -773 -2283 -133 32
Services 2996 -1175 -244 -1144 -52 -466
BRA INDIEN CHINA EBA AAKP HICAS
Wheat -39 29 -376 59 -30 -58
Other Crops 2 1 -133 37 -34 -124
Oil Seeds 244 5 -405 14 1 -204
Rice -8 35 16 -8 -13 -1
Vegetables, Fruits 390 -161 -297 -24 205 -402
Cattle -3 -2 5 0 -1 2
Other Animal Products -6 -29 -306 18 -15 71
Beef 174 22 -10 4 2 -11
Other Meat Products 275 0 -141 8 -38 80
Vegetable Oils and Fats 66 -278 -306 57 -28 289
Dairy Products -22 4 34 6 -49 18
Sugar 310 26 -25 -1773 564 6
Other Food Products 158 110 26 -357 155 772
Beverages and Tobacco -22 0 25 31 -51 29
Primary Products -40 17 -166 243 -45 -45
Manufactures -1297 56 -327 1241 -552 -667
Services -335 17 -81 547 -252 -48
JAP FSU SONEU SONAS MEDNO SONLA
Wheat -179 22 -81 -37 -613 -38
Other Crops 75 55 -51 -11 -165 -38
Oil Seeds -250 -15 -90 -22 -33 -128
Rice -114 2 -3 17 5 23
Vegetables, Fruits -586 -64 -249 -43 553 761
Cattle -71 1 -29 -16 -208 -33
Other Animal Products 127 -28 180 -61 -58 -47
Beef -456 156 -28 -27 -394 422
Other Meat Products -364 -30 -175 23 -232 -151
Vegetable Oils and Fats 289 -9 169 -33 -159 28
Dairy Products -612 155 -655 -61 -604 5
Sugar -81 104 -1 41 97 177
Other Food Products -2820 299 2181 607 -376 1152
Beverages and Tobacco 117 -73 172 14 72 -70
Primary Products 52 -40 -36 -17 367 -26
Manufactures 3884 -628 -134 -113 2280 -1367
Services 991 -193 245 -82 1433 -416
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In the case of the developing countries, almost all the regions experience a positive change in 
their trade balances for processed food products. Here, other Latin American countries show the 
strongest increases. A decomposition of the results (not shown here) indicates that the positive 
change of other Latin American countries’ trade balances for processed food is predominantly 
determined by the tariff cuts taking place in developed and developing countries. In contrast, the 
abolition of tariffs among industrialised countries reduces Latin America’s gains in the trade 
balance for processed food owing to increased trade activities among the developed countries. 
The agricultural sector producing the highest trade balance gain for industrialised countries is 
the wheat sector. Particularly the US, Canada and Oceania are able to take advantage of the 
change in the trade regimes. In contrast, the EU-27, Japan and other European countries 
(SONEU) show negative impacts on their trade balances. Compared with the developed 
countries, the group of developing regions encounters its largest trade balance loss in the wheat 
trade. In most of the individual regions belonging to this group this negative development is 
reflected. Particularly China, Brazil and MEDNO show very significant negative impacts, 
which are almost exclusively determined by the developing countries’ tariff cuts applied to 
industrial countries’ imports.  
Particularly interesting from the developing countries viewpoint is the fruit and vegetable 
sector, where strong impacts resulting from the implementation of the Harbinson 1½ approach 
can be observed. According to country category, the impacts are quite diverse, with most of the 
developed countries experiencing a significant decline in their trade balances. In contrast, the 
developing world is gaining ground. The US and Japan represent the regions that take the bulk 
of the great trade balance loss of the industrial countries’ group. The abolition of their import 
tariffs, as applied to developing countries’ imports, caused the major part of their trade balances 
to decline. But even though the loss in trade balance looks very severe, production quantity in 
this sector is reduced by only 1% in Japan and by 1.9% in the US (see Table A5 in the 
appendix). Compared with the situation in most other developing countries, the EBA region 
shows a negative development of their trade balance for fruit and vegetables. Besides sugar and 
other food products, fruit and vegetables are the most important export products of the EBA 
region. 
Table 4 shows the results when the EBA agreement is extended to other developed countries 
(Experiment 2). In examining the outcome for developed and developing countries, it is obvious 
that the results differ only slightly from those obtained in Experiment 1. Nevertheless, it 
certainly makes a difference to the LDCs. Compared to Experiment 1, Table 4 clearly shows an 
improvement in the trade balances of the most important export products of the LDCs, namely 
sugar, fruit and vegetables, oilseeds and particularly the trade in manufactures. In order to 
achieve the increased output in these export sectors, resources must be drawn from other 
sectors, such as the wheat sector. Figure 3 shows a decomposition of the changes in EBA 
countries’ trade balances for wheat in Experiment 2. Although the total impact is of a small 
magnitude, it can undoubtedly be seen that the extension of the EBA agreement to other 
developed countries has a negative effect for the wheat sector in the LDCs. This effect can also 
be observed for other crops and oil seeds. 
In contrast, Figure 4 reveals a positive effect in Experiment 2 (Harbinson, 1½ proposal, EBA 
adopted by developed countries) in the processed food product sector of the LDCs, which is 
clearly induced by the adoption of EBA agreement by all industrialised countries. Still 
dominating, however, is the negative effect resulting from the liberalisation between 
industrialised countries and the induced trade-creation effect between these countries. WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS | 11 
 
Table 4. Changes in the trade balance in Experiment 2 (Harbinson 1½ proposal, EBA adopted 
by developed countries) ($US millions) 
EU-27 USA CAN OZE INDO MAL
Wheat -53 557 862 65 -37 -13
Other Crops -593 641 179 167 -11 -20
Oil Seeds 187 565 89 10 -16 -33
Rice -123 120 -1 29 -2 1
Vegetables, Fruits -34 -557 -38 -88 98 -157
Cattle 199 177 -8 -34 -6 -1
Other Animal Products 567 -158 -80 -150 -13 -1
Beef -2608 1054 74 1368 -2 -4
Other Meat Products -252 1036 -94 35 -7 -20
Vegetable Oils and Fats -279 -25 -29 -22 15 239
Dairy Products 208 -142 -80 1628 -15 21
Sugar 764 -437 52 80 2 -9
Other Food Products -5185 1542 345 283 254 -49
Beverages and Tobacco 307 -349 -36 -109 -3 -1
Primary Products 135 -67 32 -163 37 -91
Manufactures 4347 -3494 -878 -2337 -149 -12
Services 3138 -701 -147 -1111 -46 -448
BRA INDIEN CHINA EBA AAKP HICAS
Wheat -39 30 -375 -5 -30 -58
Other Crops 2 1 -133 9 -26 -121
Oil Seeds 239 5 -404 54 1 -204
Rice -8 35 15 54 -13 -1
Vegetables, Fruits 361 -153 -296 275 181 -399
Cattle -3 -2 5 5 -1 2
Other Animal Products -6 -28 -298 -8 -15 73
B e e f 1 7 4 2 2- 9- 1 3 - 1 1
Other Meat Products 276 0 -138 0 -37 79
Vegetable Oils and Fats 69 -279 -304 -20 -27 293
Dairy Products -22 4 34 18 -48 19
Sugar 336 30 -24 -1718 549 6
Other Food Products 156 111 15 -110 154 748
Beverages and Tobacco -22 0 28 7 -48 29
Primary Products -32 13 -145 -211 -37 -53
Manufactures -1292 74 -339 1979 -536 -955
Services -314 22 -26 -818 -234 281
JAP FSU SONEU SONAS MEDNO SONLA
Wheat -178 22 -81 -37 -615 -32
Other Crops 78 55 -52 -11 -166 -32
Oil Seeds -258 -14 -89 -21 -33 -128
Rice -159 2 -3 19 5 23
Vegetables, Fruits -627 -62 -278 -44 556 681
Cattle -72 1 -30 -15 -208 -32
Other Animal Products 130 -28 182 -60 -57 -45
Beef -452 156 -28 -27 -395 426
Other Meat Products -362 -30 -177 23 -232 -149
Vegetable Oils and Fats 296 -9 169 -33 -159 41
Dairy Products -625 155 -656 -60 -605 7
Sugar -83 106 -8 40 100 172
Other Food Products -2996 286 2185 590 -374 1135
Beverages and Tobacco 121 -75 167 15 70 -66
Primary Products 64 19 -11 -14 515 31
Manufactures 3964 -654 -144 -130 2192 -1427
Services 1146 -197 255 -37 1390 -328
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Figure 3. Decomposition of the changes in EBA countries’ trade balances for wheat in 
Experiment 2 (Harbinson 1½ approach, EBA adopted by developed countries) ($US 
millions) 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Table 5 finally documents the changes in the trade balances of Experiment 3. What difference is 
to be expected when instead of the Harbinson 1½ approach, the Swiss formula is applied to cut 
the tariffs? The tariff cuts under the Harbinson 1½ proposal will reduce even very high import 
tariffs by 60% at most. Thus, protection for sensitive sectors in developed countries, such as 
sugar, beef, milk products and partly wheat and other coarse grains will still be kept at high 
magnitudes, while these tariffs are reduced below 33% under the Swiss formula. In general, it is 
therefore to be expected that the impact on these highly protected sectors is higher when the 
Swiss formula is implemented. 
Figure 4. Decomposition of the changes in EBA countries’ trade balances for processed food 
products in Experiment 2 (Harbinson 1½ approach, EBA adopted by developed 
countries) ($US millions)  
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Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
A comparison between Experiments 1 and 3 reveals that the results for wheat and beef are 
especially different. The loss of the EU’s beef trade balance in Experiment 3 is particularly 
noticeable. Comparing the worldwide protection structure of beef, it is obvious that beef is one 
of the highest protected sectors and that the EU’s beef sector is more or less a front runner. 
Negative developments in the EU’s trade balance therefore originate from import tariff cuts in 
all third countries, regardless of whether they are developed or developing (Figure 5). 
Compared with Experiment 1, the loss is much more pronounced, because higher tariff cuts 
under the Swiss formula induce an increasing trade-creation effect among third countries. 
Apparently, the EU cannot take advantage of the improved access to third countries’ beef 
markets. WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS | 13 
 
Table 5. Changes in the trade balances in Experiment 3 (Swiss formula, 33) ($US millions) 
EU-27 USA CAN OZE INDO MAL
Wheat 141 1037 1768 85 -63 -27
Other Crops -473 -444 400 481 -8 -29
Oil Seeds 142 1351 94 44 -7 -40
Rice -175 290 -1 106 -1 3
Vegetables, Fruits 569 235 -180 -266 145 -467
Cattle 528 239 -48 -63 -2 -1
Other Animal Products 673 -507 -166 -315 -13 18
Beef -3988 1806 122 2142 -3 -8
Other Meat Products 44 1859 -225 30 -11 -50
Vegetable Oils and Fats 335 -87 -70 -36 -110 129
Dairy Products 1018 216 -413 2813 -19 44
Sugar 944 -507 111 88 12 -8
Other Food Products -4429 2011 180 360 254 41
Beverages and Tobacco 342 -634 -43 -177 -4 4
Primary Products 108 -109 -4 -346 23 -224
Manufactures 1640 -5030 -769 -3644 -54 266
Services 3020 -1912 -219 -1834 -29 -1088
BRA INDIEN CHINA EBA AAKP HICAS
Wheat -32 54 -1246 77 -32 -112
Other Crops -3 2 79 52 -34 -122
Oil Seeds 617 4 -1195 21 8 -514
Rice -8 55 40 -10 -14 -2
Vegetables, Fruits 245 -248 -495 49 172 -732
Cattle -2 - 3 1 0006
Other Animal Products -3 -34 -146 29 -18 210
Beef 319 48 -3 6 -11 -10
Other Meat Products 395 0 -198 12 -49 134
Vegetable Oils and Fats 0 -539 -599 90 -27 758
Dairy Products -42 8 61 20 -62 19
Sugar 195 81 -46 -2780 868 4
Other Food Products 55 -32 -284 -404 62 1608
Beverages and Tobacco -25 15 94 6 - 6 18 2
Primary Products -39 35 -378 331 -57 -61
Manufactures -1449 203 -596 1822 -662 -1630
Services -378 39 -162 779 -302 -143
JAP FSU SONEU SONAS MEDNO SONLA
Wheat -314 27 -212 -57 -1142 -10
Other Crops 147 67 -92 -16 -150 79
Oil Seeds -401 -13 -140 -34 -49 -29
Rice -390 3 -5 29 12 45
Vegetables, Fruits -504 -102 -377 -161 345 954
Cattle -147 1 -50 -6 -478 -25
Other Animal Products 162 -54 259 -69 37 -34
Beef -391 131 -38 -34 -1321 772
Other Meat Products -492 -140 -337 -19 -606 -456
Vegetable Oils and Fats 424 -24 234 -76 -247 -174
Dairy Products -1474 288 -854 -75 -2119 -13
Sugar -114 343 8 31 107 383
Other Food Products -3118 68 2827 832 -1609 560
Beverages and Tobacco 140 -84 250 34 209 -79
Primary Products 23 -56 -51 -21 875 -26
Manufactures 5191 -619 -42 -151 6941 -1142
Services 1276 -152 412 -66 4273 -416
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Figure 5. Decomposition of the changes in the EU’s trade balance for beef in Experiment 3 
(Swiss formula, 33) ($US millions) 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
In the wheat sector, industrialised countries, particularly the US and Canada are experiencing a 
highly positive change in their trade balances, while Japan and other high-income countries in 
Asia (HICAS) along with the other European countries have to accept an increase of imports 
relative to exports. Developing countries are also facing a negative change in their trade 
balances, which is more pronounced in China and the Mediterranean and Northern African 
countries. The decomposition in Figure 6 reveals that this is mainly induced by the cut of import 
tariffs in developing countries for wheat imports coming from industrialised countries. The 
reduction of import tariffs between developing and between developed countries as well as the 
abolition of export subsidies can almost be completely disregarded. 
Figure 6. Decomposition of the changes in China’s trade balance for wheat in Experiment 3 
(Swiss formula, 33) ($US millions) 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
This effect is not surprising and can be explained with the help of the following arguments. 
First, most of the export subsidies in developed countries are concentrated in the sugar, milk and 
beef sectors, while they are more or less completely reduced in the wheat sector. Second, wheat, 
and other coarse grains already have to cope without import protection. Thus, they are much 
more competitive than the sensitive products of most developed countries. Conversely, wheat 
and other coarse grains are among the highest protected products in most developing countries. 
A tariff cut based on the Swiss formula therefore accounts for a much higher reduction in these 
sectors and accordingly results in higher negative changes in trade balances than the Harbinson 
1½ proposal. This can also be seen from Figure 7, which decomposes the change in Canada’s 
trade balance for wheat. Again, the predominant but positive effect here is the reduction of 
developing countries’ import tariffs for wheat imports coming from industrialised countries. WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS | 15 
 
Figure 7. Decomposition of the changes in Canada’s trade balance for wheat in Experiment 3 
(Swiss formula, 33) ($US millions) 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
6. Conclusions 
The WTO agricultural negotiations of the Doha round are a key issue in the public debate. This 
paper analyses the effects of different options to improve market-access on the basis of a 
general equilibrium GTAP model. An extended version of the GTAP model is used to first 
project a base run that includes factors arising from Agenda 2000, EU enlargement, the EBA 
agreement and the EU’s mid-term review. The policy simulation run additionally includes the 
WTO negotiations. Here, the model is differentiated between three experiments. While the first 
experiment simply implements the Harbinson 1½ proposal, the second one additionally takes 
into account an adoption of the EBA agreement by all industrialised countries. In the third 
experiment, the tariff cuts are based on the Swiss formula using a coefficient of 33 instead of the 
tiered approach of the Harbinson proposal. The results and a comparison of the three 
experiments reveal the following points: 
•  Results from different options for market access in the WTO negotiations of the Doha round 
show parallel developments. For example, the increase or decrease of the trade balance is 
more or less pronounced, while a change of direction is merely an exception and of a 
negligible magnitude. 
•  Implementation of the Harbinson 1½ proposal results in negative changes in the EU’s trade 
balances for most agricultural products. Particularly affected are processed food products 
and beef. In contrast, the trade balances for sugar, milk and other animal products show 
slightly positive developments. 
•  Similar effects can be observed in Japan, other high-income Asian countries, Mediterranean 
and North African countries as well as in other European countries, where agricultural 
protection is also above average. 
•  Conversely, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are able to realise some gains in 
trade in the wheat, other crops, beef, other meat products and other processed food sectors. 
Unsurprisingly, Australia and New Zealand also realise an impressive gain in the dairy 
products sector. 
•  The analysis does not reveal a uniform pattern in the results of the developing countries and 
the LDCs. Yet in most countries and regions there is a predominant increase of imports 
relative to exports. Specifically, the EBA region experiences a significant loss in the sugar 
trade balance. Given the EBA agreement already in place, the LDCs have to face an erosion 
of their preference in the WTO negotiations. Somewhat diverging from the mainstream of 16 | BROCKMEIER, KURZWEIL, PELIKAN & SALAMON 
 
developing countries are the other ACP countries, which at least realise some trade gains in 
their main export sectors of fruit, vegetables and sugar. 
•  The additional extension of the EBA agreement to the industrialised world leaves the 
developed and developing countries mainly untouched. EBA countries take advantage of 
the free access to the markets of industrialised countries and increase exports relative to 
imports for sugar, fruit and vegetables, oilseeds and particularly the trade in manufactures. 
To achieve the necessary increase in output in these main agricultural export sectors, 
resources are drawn from other sectors, mostly affecting wheat and other meat products. 
•  What difference does it make when the Swiss formula is used to cut tariffs instead of the 
tiered formula suggested in the Harbinson 1½ proposal? Predictably, it can be shown that 
worldwide the highly protected sectors experience severe losses relative to the application 
of the Harbinson 1½ approach. In the EU this mainly concerns the highly protected beef 
sector and other processed food products. 
•  Another sector that is much more affected under the Swiss formula is the wheat sector. 
Canada and the US experience a much higher positive change in their trade balances, while 
China and the Mediterranean and North African countries especially face severe losses 
owing to their high protection levels. 
•  Particularly interesting from the developing countries’ viewpoint are the trade balances for 
fruit and vegetables as well as sugar. Here, a comparison between the application of the 
Harbinson approach and the Swiss formula reveals a much higher impact on trade balances 
if the tiered formula of the Harbinson approach is used. In the case of sugar, the higher 
reduction of sugar import tariffs worldwide under the Swiss formula does not change trade 
balances very much in industrialised countries. Developed countries would be able to 
achieve a reasonable gain in their sugar trade balances, which would be more or less 
financed through erosion of the trade preferences of the EBA countries. | 17 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Comparison of the Harbinson 1½ proposal and the Doha Work Programme 
  Harbinson 1 
1/2  proposal 
(TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1) 
Doha Work 
Programme 
(WT/L/579) 
Market access    
Tariffs  Reduction from final bound tariffs 
Initial tariff  →Reduction rate 
rate (∅ / at least) 
Developed countries: 
> 90%  →∅ -60% / -45% 
< 90% >15%  →∅ -50% / -35% 
≤ 15%  →∅ -40% / -25% 
Developing countries: 
> 120%  →∅ -40% / -30% 
≤ 120%, > 60%  →∅ -35% / -25% 
>20%, ≤60%  →∅ -30% / -20% 
≤ 20%  →∅ -25% / -15% 
Implementation within five years 
Reductions through a 
tiered formula (single 
approach) from bound 
rates for all members 
other than LDCs;  
“Progressivity… 
through deeper cuts in 
higher tariffs with 
flexibilities for 
sensitive products”; no 
more details 
Tariff rate quotas  For developed (developing) countries  
TRQs<10% (6.6%) of ‘current’ domestic consumption shall 
be extended to that level (10%), or extension to 8% (5%), 
provided that the volume for a corresponding number of 
TRQs is expanded to 12% (8%) of ‘current’ domestic 
consumption 
Implementation within five years 
Expansion for 
sensitive products 
In-quota tariff rates 
 
In-quota duty free for all tropical products 
Where fill rates of TRQs on an average of three years have 
been less than 65% the in-quota tariffs shall not be reduced. 
Reduction or 
elimination 
Special agricultural 
safeguard provisions 
Outline of a new special safeguard mechanism to enable 
developing countries to take account of their development 
needs 
Remains under 
negotiation 
Export 
competition 
  
Export subsidies  -100% for agricultural products representing at least 50% of 
the aggregate final bound level of budgetary outlays (B) for 
all products subject to export subsidy commitments, final 
bound levels of budgetary outlays and quantities (Q) as 
specified in members’ schedules shall be reduced over five 
years. (formula: Bj = Bj-1 - c 
. Bj-1 (c = 0.3)
5)); the remaining 
50% of the export subsidy commitment should be reduced 
within nine years (formula: Qj = Qj-1 - c 
.Qj-1 (c = 0.25)
6)); 
reduction categories of 10 and 12 years for developing 
countries 
-100%; end date to be 
agreed 
 
Export credits, export 
credit guarantees and 
insurance 
programmes 
Shall be subject to disciplines  -100% for export 
credits, export credit 
guarantees and 
insurance programmes 
with repayment 
periods beyond 180 
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Table A1. Comparison of the Harbinson 1½ proposal and the Doha Work Programme 
(continued) 
Domestic support     
Overall cut AMS + 
permitted de 
minimis level + 
Blue box payments 
  -20% for all developed countries 
during the first year of the 
implementation period, cuts will be 
made from bound levels. 
AMS (Amber box)  -60% (developed countries) within five 
years, -40% (developing countries) within 
10 years 
for individual products:  
≤ ∅ AMS 1999-2001 
Reduction using the tiered 
approach: “Product-specific AMSs 
will be capped at their respective 
average levels according to a 
methodology to be agreed”. 
Green box  Will be maintained  Review of the criteria  
Blue box  -50% of direct payments in five years; 
implementation in equal annual instalments 
(developed countries) 
-33% in 10 years (developing countries) 
Shall be included in the calculation of the 
AMS 
Should not exceed 5% of average 
total value of agricultural 
production during a yet to be 
specified reference period (the 
Derbez text goes further: it suggests 
dates for the historical period 2000-
02 and linear reductions thereafter 
for an (x) number of years (ICTSD, 
2004) 
De minimis  -0.5% annually over a period of five years 
for developed countries 
The level of 10% for developing countries 
shall be maintained 
Reduction commitments will be 
negotiated 
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Table A2. Aggregation of countries and regions 
Countries and regions    Abbreviation  
1.  European Union 15 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden 
 EU-15 
2.  Central and Eastern European countries 
(middle and south-east European countries) 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Cyprus 
 MOEL 
3.  United States    US 
4.  Canada   CAN 
5.  Oceania  
Australia, New Zealand  
 OZE 
6.  Indonesia   INDO 
7.  Malaysia   MAL 
8.  Brazil   BRA 
9.  India   INDIEN 
10.  China   CHINA 
11.  Everything But Arms countries  
Bangladesh, Rest of South Asia, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Other Southern Africa, Uganda and the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 
 EBA 
12.  Other African, Caribbean and Pacific countries  
Central America, Caribbean, Botswana and Zimbabwe 
 AAKP 
13.  High-income Asia 
Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore 
 HICAS 
14.  Japan   JAP 
15.  Former Soviet Union 
The rest of the former Soviet Union 
 FSU 
16.  Other European countries 
Switzerland and the rest of the EFTA members 
 SONEU 
17.  Other Asian countries 
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Sri Lanka  
 SONAS 
18.  Mediterranean and North African countries 
Turkey, the rest of the Middle East, Morocco and the rest of North Africa 
 MEDNO 
19.  Other Latin America 
Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Rest of Andean Pact, Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay, Rest of South America  
 SONLA 
20.  Rest of world 
Croatia, the rest of the South African Customs Union and the rest of the world
 ROW 
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Table A3. Aggregation of sectors 
Sectors   Abbreviation
1. Wheat    WEIZ 
2. Cereal  grains  nec    AGETR 
3. Oil  seeds    OELSAAT 
4.  Sugar cane, sugar beet    ZUKR 
5. Paddy  rice    REIS 
6.  Vegetables, fruit, nuts, crops nec    GMFRAP 
7.  Cattle, sheep, goats, horses    RIND 
8.  Animal products nec    ANDTIER 
9. Raw  milk    MILCH 
10.  Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horses    RINDFL 
11. Meat  products  nec    ANDFL 
12.  Vegetable oils and fats    OELE 
13. Dairy  products    MIPRD 
14. Sugar    ZUCKER 
15.  Processed rice, food products nec    SNM 
16.  Beverages and tobacco products    GTTAB 
17. Primary  sectors 
Plant-based fibres, wool, silk-worm, cocoons, forestry, fishing, coal, oil, gas, 
minerals nec, petroleum, coal products 
  PRIMA 
18. Industry 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products, wood products, paper products, 
publishing, chemical/rubber/plastic prods., mineral products nec, ferrous 
metals, metals nec, metal products, motor vehicles and parts, transport 
equipment, electronic equipment, machinery and equipment, manufactures 
nec 
  INDU 
 
19. Services 
Electricity, gas manufacture, distribution, water, construction, trade, transport 
nec, sea transport, air transport, communication, financial services nec, 
insurance, business services nec, recreation and other services, public 
admin./defence/health/education, dwellings 
  DIENST 
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Table A4. Pre-simulations, Agenda 2000 and EU enlargement 
Pre-simulations: 
CAP instruments 
•  complementarity approach is taken for milk and sugar (assumption: quantity in the database 
represents production quotas) 
•  land subsidy is equalised across sectors to implement a homogeneous area payment 
EU’s common budget  
•  75% of tariff revenues as well as a share of GDP is accrued to the EU budget; determination 
of a uniform endogenous GDP rate 
•  expenses of the EAGGF are paid for by the common EU budget 
•  entails net transfers between EU member states 
Agenda 2000: 
Cereals 
•  reduction of intervention prices by 15% 
•  unification of direct payments for cereals, oilseeds and protein plants 
•  reduction of set-aside rate from 15% to 10% 
Beef 
•  reduction of intervention prices by 18% 
•  no change in direct payments (assumption: an increase in direct payments is compensated 
by a lower output) 
Milk 
•  reduction of intervention prices by 15% 
•  retention of quota regulation 
•  increase of quota by 2.4% 
EU enlargement: 
Creation of a customs union 
•  EU-15 and the middle and south-east European countries (MOEL) abolish all bilateral trade 
barriers 
•  MOEL to establish the trade protection of the EU-15  
•  production quotas for milk and sugar are fixed at the current production level of the MOEL 
•  there is no set-aside in the new member countries  
•  direct payments in the EU-15 remain unchanged 
•  100% of the current land and animal premiums in the EU-15 are transferred to the new 
member states (standard procedure) 
•  ceilings are fixed for direct payments with an endogenous adjustment of the premium rate for 
land and animals in the EU-15 
Common EU budget 
•  complete integration of the MOEL in the common budget of the EU: 90% of tariff revenues 
as well as a share of GDP to the EU budget 
•  payments in the framework of the EAGGF in the MOEL through the common budget 
•  implementation of net transfers between the EU-15 and the MOEL 
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Table A5. Changes in output in Experiment 1 (Harbinson 1½ proposal) (%) 
EU27 USA CAN OZE INDO MAL
Wheat -1.9 3.2 8.3 -0.8 6.9 -3.0
Other Crops -6.3 1.6 3.9 6.3 0.0 1.5
Oil Seeds 1.7 1.1 0.0 0.7 -0.2 4.7
Sugar Cane, Sugar Beet -0.1 -7.4 14.6 2.3 0.3 0.8
Rice -12.8 6.1 0.3 13.9 0.7 0.9
Vegetables, Fruits -0.6 -1.0 -1.3 -1.4 0.3 -3.4
Cattle -3.6 2.1 -0.2 6.5 -0.1 4.2
Other Animal Products 0.5 0.2 -5.0 -4.8 -0.3 0.9
Raw Milk 0.0 -0.6 -4.1 15.3 -0.5 7.0
Beef -5.9 1.8 1.0 14.5 0.0 2.0
Other Meat Products -0.5 1.8 -3.8 0.8 -0.8 -1.2
Vegetable Oils and Fats -1.0 -0.3 -0.6 -1.9 0.0 5.9
Dairy Products -0.2 -0.6 -5.7 17.6 9.6 7.6
Sugar 0.0 -7.7 27.3 2.5 0.4 0.0
Other Food Products -2.7 0.7 1.7 2.0 0.7 1.5
Beverages and Tobacco 0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -1.4 -0.1 0.0
Primary Products 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2
Manufactures 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -1.9 -0.3 0.5
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3
BRA INDIEN CHINA EBA AAKP HICAS
Wheat 0.2 0.3 -4.4 2.1 1.5 4.8
Other Crops 0.4 -0.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.9 -21.0
Oil Seeds 1.7 0.0 -5.2 -0.4 0.9 -8.1
Sugar Cane, Sugar Beet 1.0 0.0 -0.5 -6.1 9.3 3.4
Rice 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.4 2.5
Vegetables, Fruits 0.4 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.6 -1.0
Cattle 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 1.0
Other Animal Products 1.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -1.1 1.7
Raw Milk -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.3 0.2 2.3
Beef 1.0 13.6 0.1 1.1 0.0 1.0
Other Meat Products 2.0 2.8 -0.1 0.4 -2.1 1.7
Vegetable Oils and Fats 0.3 -3.5 -3.1 0.5 -1.9 13.7
Dairy Products 0.0 0.3 4.9 -1.0 1.2 2.7
Sugar 1.8 0.2 -1.9 -16.3 15.4 3.8
Other Food Products 0.1 2.1 0.0 -0.6 1.5 2.9
Beverages and Tobacco -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 -1.1 0.4
Primary Products -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.4 0.0
Manufactures -0.4 0.1 0.1 1.6 -1.4 -0.2
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0
JAP FSU SONEURO SONAS MEDNO SONLA
Wheat -59.8 3.2 -10.4 -0.7 -3.1 0.5
Other Crops -8.2 3.8 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.1
Oil Seeds -11.0 -1.2 -4.5 -3.3 -2.6 -0.9
Sugar Cane, Sugar Beet -6.1 11.8 10.2 0.7 0.7 1.3
Rice -3.3 1.3 14.0 1.2 -0.3 1.8
Vegetables, Fruits -1.9 0.1 -5.2 -0.2 0.0 0.9
Cattle -8.8 4.7 -4.6 -0.2 -3.1 0.6
Other Animal Products -0.7 -0.8 7.6 -0.8 -2.0 -0.8
Raw Milk -7.4 2.0 -18.2 0.0 -1.6 0.3
Beef -3.8 5.1 0.2 -0.4 -5.3 1.2
Other Meat Products -4.8 0.9 -10.3 0.2 -14.9 -1.0
Vegetable Oils and Fats 7.6 -1.6 42.0 -1.9 -4.2 0.0
Dairy Products -8.9 5.7 -29.1 2.6 -4.9 0.6
Sugar -6.5 14.8 11.8 0.7 2.5 1.6
Other Food Products -1.6 1.6 20.9 1.3 -1.1 1.3
Beverages and Tobacco 0.7 -0.8 6.8 0.4 0.7 -0.2
Primary Products 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.1
Manufactures 0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 0.6 -0.3
Services 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
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Table A6. Changes in output in Experiment 2 (Harbinson 1½ proposal, EBA adopted by 
developed countries) (%) 
EU27 USA CAN OZE INDO MAL
Wheat -1.9 3.4 8.4 -0.5 -3.0 -3.0
Other Crops -6.3 1.6 3.9 6.3 1.5 1.5
Oil Seeds 1.6 1.0 -0.2 0.7 4.8 4.8
Sugar Cane, Sugar Beet -0.1 -8.1 13.3 2.1 0.8 0.8
Rice -12.8 5.7 0.1 11.4 0.9 0.9
Vegetables, Fruits -0.5 -1.2 -1.5 -1.4 -3.4 -3.4
Cattle -3.6 2.1 -0.2 6.5 4.2 4.2
Other Animal Products 0.5 0.2 -4.9 -4.8 0.9 0.9
Raw Milk 0.0 -0.6 -4.1 15.3 7.0 7.0
Beef -5.9 1.8 1.0 14.5 2.0 2.0
Other Meat Products -0.5 1.8 -3.8 0.8 -1.2 -1.2
Vegetable Oils and Fats -0.9 -0.2 -0.6 -1.9 6.4 6.4
Dairy Products -0.2 -0.6 -5.7 17.6 7.6 7.6
Sugar 0.0 -8.4 24.7 2.2 0.0 0.0
Other Food Products -2.7 0.7 1.6 1.9 1.5 1.5
Beverages and Tobacco 0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -1.4 0.0 0.0
Primary Products 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.2
Manufactures 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -2.0 0.4 0.4
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.3
BRA INDIEN CHINA EBA AAKP HICAS
Wheat 0.2 0.3 -4.4 1.1 1.6 4.8
Other Crops 0.4 -0.1 -0.7 0.0 -0.3 -21.0
Oil Seeds 1.7 0.0 -5.3 -0.3 0.9 -8.1
Sugar Cane, Sugar Beet 1.2 -0.1 -0.5 -6.1 9.0 3.4
Rice 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 2.5
Vegetables, Fruits 0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.5 0.5 -1.0
Cattle 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.0
Other Animal Products 1.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -1.1 1.7
Raw Milk -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.3 2.3
Beef 1.0 13.5 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0
Other Meat Products 2.0 2.7 -0.1 0.0 -2.0 1.7
Vegetable Oils and Fats 0.3 -3.5 -3.1 -1.5 -1.9 13.8
Dairy Products 0.0 0.3 4.9 -0.3 1.3 2.7
Sugar 2.1 0.2 -1.8 -16.3 15.0 3.7
Other Food Products 0.1 2.1 0.0 -0.3 1.5 2.9
Beverages and Tobacco -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 -1.0 0.4
Primary Products -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.0
Manufactures -0.4 0.1 0.1 1.8 -1.4 -0.2
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
JAP FSU SONEURO SONAS MEDNO SONLA
Wheat -59.8 3.1 -10.3 -0.7 -3.2 0.5
Other Crops -8.2 3.7 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.1
Oil Seeds -11.2 -1.2 -3.7 -3.2 -2.6 -0.8
Sugar Cane, Sugar Beet -6.2 12.0 9.4 0.7 0.7 1.2
Rice -3.6 1.2 13.5 1.1 -0.2 1.7
Vegetables, Fruits -2.0 0.1 -5.6 -0.2 0.1 0.8
Cattle -8.8 4.7 -4.6 -0.2 -3.1 0.6
Other Animal Products -0.7 -0.8 7.7 -0.8 -2.0 -0.8
Raw Milk -7.4 2.0 -18.2 0.0 -1.6 0.3
Beef -3.8 5.1 0.2 -0.4 -5.3 1.2
Other Meat Products -4.8 0.8 -10.3 0.3 -14.9 -1.0
Vegetable Oils and Fats 7.7 -1.7 42.2 -1.9 -4.3 0.1
Dairy Products -8.9 5.7 -29.1 2.6 -4.9 0.6
Sugar -6.5 15.0 11.0 0.7 2.5 1.6
Other Food Products -1.8 1.6 21.1 1.3 -1.1 1.3
Beverages and Tobacco 0.7 -0.8 6.9 0.4 0.7 -0.2
Primary Products 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0
Manufactures 0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 0.5 -0.3
Services 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 26 | BROCKMEIER, KURZWEIL, PELIKAN & SALAMON 
 
Table A7. Changes in output in Experiment 3 (Swiss formula, 33) (%) 
EU27 USA CAN OZE INDO MAL
Wheat -0.7 6.5 16.8 -1.6 -13.1 -13.1
Other Crops -5.4 0.0 7.4 17.0 5.1 5.1
Oil Seeds 2.5 3.1 -2.1 5.9 9.4 9.4
Sugar Cane, Sugar Beet -0.3 -9.4 26.3 1.9 2.3 2.3
Rice -16.7 13.2 -1.5 36.4 2.5 2.5
Vegetables, Fruits 0.0 -0.5 -4.8 -3.6 -8.9 -8.9
Cattle -4.5 3.6 -1.3 9.7 8.2 8.2
Other Animal Products 0.8 -0.3 -9.4 -10.1 2.1 2.1
Raw Milk 0.0 0.1 -10.3 25.8 11.8 11.8
Beef -8.5 3.2 1.5 22.1 0.6 0.6
Other Meat Products -0.2 3.3 -7.2 0.2 -3.1 -3.1
Vegetable Oils and Fats 0.2 -1.0 -1.8 -3.6 7.1 7.1
Dairy Products 0.0 0.1 -14.3 29.8 12.6 12.6
Sugar 0.0 -9.7 48.5 2.1 1.7 1.7
Other Food Products -2.5 0.8 -0.2 2.1 4.2 4.2
Beverages and Tobacco 0.9 -0.6 -0.7 -2.4 0.5 0.5
Primary Products 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -1.2 -0.5 -0.5
Manufactures 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -3.1 1.5 1.5
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.6
BRA INDIEN CHINA EBA AAKP HICAS
Wheat 0.6 0.5 -13.2 3.4 2.0 9.9
Other Crops 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.8 -51.8
Oil Seeds 3.8 -0.1 -12.7 -0.8 2.3 -20.0
Sugar Cane, Sugar Beet 0.5 -0.1 -1.0 -9.9 14.9 4.8
Rice -0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.5 0.5 5.5
Vegetables, Fruits 0.1 -0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 -1.9
Cattle 1.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 2.0
Other Animal Products 1.6 -0.1 0.6 0.2 -1.4 3.8
Raw Milk -0.5 0.0 0.5 -0.4 0.0 3.0
Beef 1.9 29.0 0.6 1.7 -0.6 1.9
Other Meat Products 2.9 6.2 0.0 0.7 -2.7 3.0
Vegetable Oils and Fats -0.7 -6.7 -5.3 0.0 -1.9 37.5
Dairy Products -0.1 0.5 7.3 0.9 0.3 3.4
Sugar 0.7 0.6 -3.8 -26.2 24.6 5.3
Other Food Products -0.1 -0.7 -0.2 -0.7 0.4 6.5
Beverages and Tobacco -0.3 0.1 0.6 0.5 -1.3 1.1
Primary Products -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 -0.5 0.0
Manufactures -0.5 0.2 0.2 2.3 -1.6 -0.4
Services 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1
JAP FSU SONEURO SONAS MEDNO SONLA
Wheat -83.0 3.0 -37.5 0.2 -6.9 0.6
Other Crops -4.1 3.8 -5.7 0.8 -1.1 0.2
Oil Seeds -11.8 -1.9 -5.5 -5.6 -4.5 -0.7
Sugar Cane, Sugar Beet -8.3 32.5 10.6 0.6 -0.3 2.3
Rice -5.6 0.3 24.6 1.6 -1.3 2.3
Vegetables, Fruits -1.7 -0.7 -7.0 -0.6 -1.2 1.0
Cattle -11.1 4.2 -6.9 0.4 -7.6 1.1
Other Animal Products 0.4 -4.2 10.2 -1.1 -3.1 -1.7
Raw Milk -13.5 2.4 -23.4 -0.2 -5.3 0.3
Beef -2.9 4.6 0.8 -0.6 -16.6 2.3
Other Meat Products -6.6 -2.9 -18.8 -0.6 -33.7 -2.5
Vegetable Oils and Fats 12.0 -6.0 63.9 -4.7 -6.7 -1.3
Dairy Products -16.6 8.5 -37.6 3.5 -17.5 0.5
Sugar -8.7 41.8 13.2 0.5 1.7 3.1
Other Food Products -1.6 0.2 31.2 1.7 -4.1 0.5
Beverages and Tobacco 0.8 -0.9 9.9 0.9 2.6 -0.3
Primary Products 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.1
Manufactures 0.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 2.1 -0.3
Services -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.  
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